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Recent experiments have perfectly verified the fact that quantum correlations between
two entangled particles are stronger than any classical, local pre-quantum worldview al-
lows. This is famously called the EPR paradox first conceived as a thought experiment
and decades later realized in the lab. We discuss in depth the nature of the paradox and
show that the problematics it presents is first and foremost epistemological. After briefly
exploring resolutions to the paradox that after many decades of discourse still remain con-
troversial, we argue that the paradox is rooted in the failure of our current metaphysical
scheme, being the foundation of our knowledge, to accommodate and cohere our knowl-
edge of the phenomena of entanglement. We then develop and make the case for a novel
and more fundamental resolution of the paradox by changing the underlying metaphysical
foundation from one based on individuals to a one based on individuation. We discuss in
detail how in the light of this new scheme concepts central to the paradox such as realism,
causality and locality are adjusted to the effect that the paradox is resolved without giving
up these concepts so fundamental to our thinking. We conclude with a brief note about the
important role of metaphysics to the progress of knowledge and our understanding of reality.
Keywords: quantum entanglement, EPR paradox, individuation, metaphysics, realism ,
locality, causation
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1 Introduction
Every year the prestigious web magazine Edge1 pronounces a yearly question and invites
distinguished thinkers from diverse disciplines to answer. The 2016 Edge question was:
“What do you consider the most interesting recent scientific news? What makes it
important?”. My motivation for writing this paper came from reading quantum physicist
professor Anton Zeilinger’s2 answer to this question. A quote from Zeilinger’s answer is
in place:
The notion of quantum entanglement, famously called spooky action at
a distance by Einstein emerges more and more as having deep implications
for our understanding of the World. Recent experiments have perfectly ver-
ified the fact that quantum correlations between two entangled particles are
stronger than any classical, local pre-quantum worldview allows. So, since
quantum physics predicts these measurement results for at least eighty years,
whats the deal?
The point is that the predictions of quantum mechanics are independent of
the relative arrangement in space and time of the individual measurements.
Fully independent of their distance, independent of which is earlier or later
etc. One has perfect correlations between all of an entangled system even as
these correlations cannot be explained by properties carried by the system
before measurement. So quantum mechanics transgresses space and time in
a very deep sense. We would be well advised to reconsider the foundations of
space and time in a conceptual way. (my emphasis)
My goal in this paper is exactly this: a reconsideration of the conceptual foundations of
realism and specifically of space in the light of the phenomenon of quantum entanglement.
I will apply Simondon’s theory of individuation and Bergson’s conceptualization of space
in order to reexamine what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance” and more
specifically the notion of physical locality and its underlying metaphysical assumptions.
The examination will lead first to developing and arguing for an alternative metaphysical
scheme that coherently accommodates both quantum and classical phenomena. This
alternative scheme adjusts our understanding of realism and will further make a case for
developing a new non-conventional (and somewhat surprising) intuition about the reality
of space and how it is represented. With the renewed conceptualizations developed, it is
shown that nothing spooky is taking place in quantum entanglement; at least not spooky
in the sense that Einstein meant. The resolution of the paradoxical action at distance
responsible for innumerable sleepless nights of physicists and philosophers alike, is thus
shown to be possible by adopting the alternative metaphysical scheme we develop here.
With it we can finally cohere our knowledge about quantum entanglement with the rest
of our knowledge about natural phenomena.
The second section gives a short description of the EPR paradox and the violation of
Bell’s inequalities. It will then discuss more in depth the meaning of this violation and
1See: http://edge.org/response-detail/26790.
2See: http://edge.org/memberbio/anton zeilinger.
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the problem of non-locality and causation in quantum entangled systems. The section
concludes by proposing a conceptual revision of the problem and sketches the metaphysi-
cal adjustments that are needed in order to resolve the paradox. The third section starts
with a critique of Boole’s conditions of possible experience. Next, it presents in brief
Simondon’s theory of individuation and the application of the concept of individuation
to entangled systems. It then develops in depth the new conceptions of realism and
causal explanation in the light of a metaphysical scheme based on individuation. The
fourth section is dedicated to the individuation of space and how it reflects on entangled
systems. It starts with general considerations regarding the concept of locality as it
is currently understood and its limitations. It then explores Bergson’s metaphysics of
space and applies it to argue that in the case of entangled systems also space and locality
are subject to individuation. By that the development of the alternative metaphysical
scheme started in section 3 is completed. A discussion of the philosophical implications
on understanding locality in entangled systems follows. The fifth and last section is a
summary of the whole conceptual revision developed in the paper and how it resolves
the paradox. It concludes with a short note on the role of metaphysical investigation in
cohering our knowledge about reality.
2 The EPR paradox and the nature of quantum phenomena
2.1 A short account of the EPR experiment and Bell’s inequalities
Around 1935 a paper authored by Albert Einstein, Boris Podolski and Nathan Rosen
(Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, 1935), presented a thought experiment that claimed to
demonstrate that the quantum wave function does not provide a complete description
of physical reality. This has come to be known as the EPR paradox. The thought
experiment was set to show that a measurement of the location and momentum of two
entangled physical particles can be performed in a manner that violates Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle. Two physical particles are prepared in advance in such a manner
that they are quantum entangled. The peculiar nature of quantum properties is such that
for an entangled system of particles a certain property cannot be described or measured
independently for each particle but only for the joint system as a whole3. Skipping
the technical and mathematical details, the gist of the experiment was that once the
entangled particles are physically separated in space, one can measure accurately the
location of one particle and the momentum of the second. Since they are entangled,
the momentum of the first particle can be accurately derived from the measurement of
the second. This way one can measure both the location and momentum of one of the
particles more accurately than what is allowed by the uncertainty principle. Two possible
explanations are suggested: a) Either the measurement performed on one particle affects
instantaneously the other over an arbitrary distance to prevent the violation – what
3We will later see that this very peculiarity is central to the question of whether or not in the case of
quantum entangled systems one can speak about two independent particles.
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came to be coined as “spooky action at a distance”4, or, b) the information about
the outcome of all possible measurements is already present in both particles to begin
with and is encoded with some ‘hidden variables’ that were set once the particles were
brought into entanglement and carried along independently by each. To the authors,
the possibility of non-local effects arising in entangled systems was unacceptable; which
led them to the conclusion that the description of the entangled system of particles as a
single non-decomposable system must be incomplete. In other words, the particles are
singled out by hidden variables local to each. The incompleteness of quantum theory is
that it falls short of predicting accurately the states of entangled particles though these
are determined by their hidden variables. A proper local hidden variables theory that
would presumably do better is needed to replace quantum theory. Such a hidden variable
theory will affirm what is called local realism also for quantum phenomena. Where in
brief, locality basically means that no instantaneous action at a distance is possible and
realism claims that physical particles possess definite properties irrespective to whether
or when actual measurements are performed to obtain these properties. Thus a local
realist quantum theory will cohere our knowledge about physical phenomena both classic
and quantum under the same fundamental principles of locality and realism. The EPR
experiment can be seen therefore as an attempt to ‘tame’ quantum phenomena into an
already established dogma.
In a seminal paper published in 1964, John Bell (1964) came with a theorem stat-
ing that any physical theory that assumes local realism must satisfy certain conditions
called Bell’s inequalities. Bell developed a somewhat different version of the experiment
described in the EPR paper using particle spins rather than location and momentum as
the measured quantum properties. He showed that the predictions of quantum theory
regarding measurements performed on entangled systems violate his inequalities. The
consequences of such violation, if verified by actual experiments, will exclude any pos-
sibility of a local realist hidden variable theory to reproduce the results predicted by
quantum theory.
Actual experiments equivalent to the EPR experiment were conducted since 1976 with
overwhelming evidence that measurements of quantum entangled systems do violate
Bell’s inequalities. In the course of research various loopholes were discovered in the
experiments and new setups were progressively devised to avoid them. In October 2015
the first loophole-free experiment was reported (Hensen et al., 2015), directly testing
Bell’s theorem and demonstrating yet again the peculiar nature of quantum phenomena.
Probably it is this outstanding result that inspired Zeilinger’s answer.
There is a rich literature covering the complex physics of quantum entanglement which
is far from being covered by the brief treatment given here. The important point however
is that it has become finally evident by experiment that the phenomenon of quantum
entanglement presents behaviors which are not coherent with our common intuitions
regarding space and time. As Zeilinger concludes: “Thus, it appears that on the level
of measurements of properties of members of an entangled ensemble, quantum physics
4Such effect however does not violate spacial relativity because no information is exchanged between
the particles.
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is oblivious to space and time.” Trying to settle this apparent discrepancy and under-
standing the meaning of this radical statement is the point of departure of this paper.
2.2 Bell’s inequalities and Boole’s conditions of possible experience
To develop a deeper understanding of Bell’s inequalities and their meaning it is impor-
tant to note that they do not describe a quantum physical principle or even a physical
principle. Bell’s inequalities rather state the conditions that must hold regarding knowl-
edge that can be obtained by statistical sampling of a population of objects for which
local realism holds. I.e. a population of objects that possesses (and are defined by)
measurement independent properties and interact only according to the principle of lo-
cality. Pitowsky shows in (Pitowsky, 1994) and more extensively in (Pitowsky, 1989)
that the Bell inequalities are a special case of Boole’s conditions of possible experience.
Given a certain body of data concerning a population of objects, let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be
the probabilities given of certain events. And where an event can be understood as the
existence or non-existence of a certain set of properties in a single object. Pi therefore
is the frequency of finding a set of properties i in the population. In the trivial case,
where no relations obtain among the events, then the only constraints imposed on the
probabilities is that 0 ≤ Pi ≤ 1.
However, if the events are logically connected, there are further equalities or inequal-
ities that obtain among the different probabilities. Let us consider a simple example:
suppose we get an urn with many balls some of which are wooden (event E1) with prob-
ability P1 and some of them are red (event E2) with probability P2. Now, we sample
balls from the urn and we are interested in the frequencies of events such as E1 or E2
but also in the frequency P12 of sampling balls which are both wooden and red (event
E1∩E2). These three events here are not logically independent of course and in addition
to the trivial inequalities 0 ≤ P1, P2, P12 ≤ 1 we also have: P1 ≥ P12, P2 ≥ P12. Also the
frequency P1+P2−P12 of sampling balls which are either wooden or red (event E1∪E2)
must hold: P1 + P2 − P12 ≤ 1. The various versions of Bell’s inequalities5 and other
similar sets of constraints that are used in quantum theory are obtained in a similar way
by applying logical rules to probabilities of properties and events (the occurrence of a
single property is the simplest kind of event). Boole (Boole, 1862; Hailperin, 1986) called
these constraints conditions of possible experience because any observation/experience
that involves probabilistic sampling of real properties of objects must logically stand to
these conditions.
Remarkably, none of Boole’s conditions can be violated when all the relative frequen-
cies are measured on a single sample of the population. In the above example suppose
that we take 100 balls out of the urn. we discover that 60 are wooden and 75 are red and
32 of them are both red and wooden. In terms of frequencies, P1 = 0.6 and P2 = 0.75
and P12 = 0.32. But then P1 + P2 − P12 > 1 which is a logical impossibility because in
such case there must be a ball which is ‘red’, ‘wooden’ but not ‘red and wooden’. With-
out exception, as long as we make all measurements on a single sample, similar logical
5The Bell inequalities involve three primitive properties and their combinations. See (Pitowsky, 1994,
pp. 103-104)
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impossibilities will arise in conjunction with the violation of one or more of Boole’s con-
ditions also in arbitrarily complicated cases. However, if for some reason or other, the
measurements of logically dependent events are not made on a single sample, violations
of Boole’s conditions may occur. Pitowsky (1994, pp. 105-107) lists a few reasons why
such violations may happen:
1. Failure of randomness – A violation of Boole’s conditions may occur if one or more
of the distinct samples fail to represent the distribution properties in the overall
population. The population might be not well mixed, the samples too small etc.
2. Measurement biases – Even if the samples are perfectly random, violation can still
occur if the observations are somehow biased or disturbed because they are not
well performed. In the above example we could imagine that the property ’red’ is
observed under certain lightning conditions while the property ’red and wooden’
is performed under different lighting conditions.
3. No distribution – According to the law of large numbers, the relative frequency of
a property in a finite random sample approximates, with high probability, the
frequency of that property in the larger population. For that reason we expect
Boole’s conditions to hold even when relative frequencies are measured over dis-
tinct samples. But this consideration hides the assumption that the hypothetical
population we examine does have an a priori distribution of properties that is the
cause for the measurements obtained. But according to Hume’s empiricist skep-
ticism (Hume, 2012), the attribution of causal explanation between two events
cannot be logically justified. Specifically, the attribution of relative frequencies to
an a priori distribution of the population is merely an induction. The failure of
Boole’s conditions may therefore arise even when samples are sufficiently random-
ized and measurement biases have been eliminated simply because the habitual
assumption about a causative explanation is not valid. It might well be that there
is no population with stable properties and consequently no distribution. There is
also the case that somehow properties do not exist independently of measurement.
This consideration is not merely technical like the first two and will be further
discussed later.
4. Mathematical oddities – Within certain mathematical considerations of how the
probability measure is defined, there are exotic cases of distribution in a con-
tinuous probability space ( as opposed to discrete populations of objects) where
there is a logical possibility of the violation of Boole’s conditions. But this option
will not be our concern here as it can hardly apply to natural phenomena.
The nature of quantum phenomena is such that certain sets of properties are comple-
mentary (e.g. the position and momentum of a particle) which means that according
to the uncertainty principle, these properties cannot be measured simultaneously, or,
at least we do not know how to perform such simultaneous measurements. Still, these
properties do hold between them logical dependencies such as those discussed here.
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Interestingly, Pitowsky notes that when we do know how to perform simultaneous mea-
surements of a certain set of properties (i.e. in the case they are not complementary),
there is no violation of Boole’s conditions even when the measurements are performed
on distinct samples (Pitowsky, 1994, p 109). However, testing the behavior of quantum
entangled systems specifically involve complementary properties for which no method
for simultaneous measurement is known to exist. In such cases, it is necessary to perform
measurements over multiple distinct samples. It is in such cases and only in such cases
that quantum theory predicts outcomes that are in violation of Boole’s conditions. A
violation of Boole’s conditions therefore is unique to those cases where no method for
simultaneous measurement is known to exist.
This analysis clearly exposes the serious threat that quantum phenomena presents to
the consistency of our knowledge and understanding of natural phenomena. The paradox
goes beyond physics and one needs therefore to come up with a convincing explanation
for the violation of Boole’s conditions. In other words, to plausibly show that the arising
logical contradictions involved are only apparent, that there is no actual threat to our
logical conceptions. Of the four categories of explanations mentioned above, we can
quite safely discard the fourth category of mathematical oddities as a relevant candidate
if only because of Ockham’s razor (ibid., p 119). In regard to the first category – failure
of randomness, this is basically a technical issue that early experiments were ridden
with. New measurement methods and the progressive elimination of various loopholes
as reported in (Hensen et al., 2015) pretty much eliminates this category too. We are
left with the second and third categories which are more interesting because in contrast
they offer explanatory interpretations of quantum mechanics that challenge our most
basic intuitions.
2.3 The problem of non-locality and realism in entangled systems
The second category of explanations involve measurement biases of two kinds: a) a bias
that depends on the measurement equipment and method and that can be eliminated by
improved technology, and b) a bias which is built-in in the setup of experiments that can-
not be removed by improved technology. Explanations that involve measurement biases
of the second kind are usually referred to as hidden variables theories. It is hypothesized
that such variables that are not defined in the current quantum theory (i.e. hidden form
it) display dynamic changes that bias the results of measurements in such manner as to
produce the appearance of violation of Boole’s conditions. In other words, the violation
is an illusion only indicating the incompleteness of the current theory. Were we in pos-
session of a better theory that exposes the hidden variables, its predictions wouldn‘t have
violated Boole’s conditions at all. As already discussed in subsection 2.1, experimental
reality is quite embarrassing in this respect: all hidden variable explanations coherent
with experiment involve non-locality i.e. effects that propagate instantaneously across
arbitrary distances. Again, it is not that something is fundamentally wrong with hidden
variables explanations; they simply do not add anything that explains away the dis-
turbing peculiarities of quantum entanglement. Instead, they just re-describe them in
different terms leaving our deepest intuitions about locality in question. Still, having to
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choose between logical contradiction and non-local effects, the latter is the lesser evil.
We are left to consider the third category of explanations. As was already discussed
above, the third category brings up the problem of realism. Given the violation of Boole’s
conditions in the case of measuring complementary quantum properties, and given the
inconvenience invoked by non-locality as a possible justification, we may consider the
alternative that an a priori distribution of the population of events/objects under exam-
ination does not exist and if so, distinct samples do not represent a single hypothetical
population in possession of stable properties that exist independently of measurement
or other interactions. As Pitowsky puts it:
What is at stake is the idea of causality. The ’no distribution’ approach
takes the view that certain phenomena, or more precisely, certain aspects of
certain phenomena, have no causal explanation. They simply occur and that
is it.
This approach is not a radical departure from the general empiricist suspicious view of
causal explanations. The function of a scientific theory, as perceived by the empiricist,
is to organize data and predict. Causal explanation is a fiction of the human mind
riding on a theory’s ability to organize and predict. Which intuition locality or realism
would be worth keeping and which could be sacrificed to make the behavior of quantum
entanglement a ‘possible experience’? At this point this is a matter of controversy among
both physicists and philosophers.
The philosophical riddle presented here is apparently an epistemological one. A fun-
damental part of the physical world - the world of the very small, behaves in a way
that seems to put in doubt the human ability to create a unified and coherent corpus of
knowledge. We cannot do with ’impossible experiences’ running havoc in our laborato-
ries. Given the history of research in quantum physics it is not very plausible (though
not ultimately refutable) that some fine detail of the theory has escaped us and once
it will be discovered, everything will be put in order. The controversy regarding non-
locality and realism that remains unresolved is philosophically very disturbing. In as far
as the empiricist physicist is concerned, physics is okay; quantum theory is one of the
most successful scientific theories ever devised. It is our conceptions that need revision.
2.4 A conceptual revision
The currently accepted idea is to either give up locality or realism. As each alone seem
to resolve the paradox, it would seem reasonable that choosing only one minimizes the
’damage’ inflicted on our sensibilities. But perhaps there is a way to somehow give up
both in their current form and instead rethink their deeper meaning in a way that will
shed new light on possible experiences and will allow us to keep both albeit with a slight
yet profound new meaning. In the following I am going to describe and defend such
an alternative approach. We start with the claim that the paradox we are facing is not
merely epistemological but is rooted in the very concept of space insofar it is applied
to locality and in what we conceive as real insofar it is applied to the properties of
physical entities. In other words, the impasse the paradox presents is metaphysical. It is
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metaphysics that shapes our intuitions and it is metaphysics that needs to be adjusted.
Here is a sketch of the proposed adjustment:
1. In developing Boole’s conditions of possible experience, Aristotle’s principle of the
excluded middle is implicitly taken as given. That is, a property either exists or
does not exist in any object or event of interest. Our criticism of Boole’s conditions
is that while this assumption may be legitimate for abstract objects and proper-
ties, its automatic extension to physical objects and events is far from warranted.
Independently of one’s knowledge about a certain property, it is conceivable that
properties undergo a process of genesis or differentiation and are not a priori given
or just appear instantaneously.
2. Simondon’s theory of individuation proposes a metaphysics of formative processes
that replaces the metaphysics based on fully formed individuals on which Boole’s
conditions are based. The idea of individuation allows to replace the hard realism
described by Boole’s conditions with a soft realism where properties and entities
defined by properties are not given a priori as fully formed individuals but undergo
a process of coming into being – individuation. The violation of Boole’s conditions
when applied to undifferentiated properties then merely indicates the inadequacy
of hard realism as a description of quantum phenomena whereas soft realism is
entirely consistent with it.
3. In subsection 3.3, soft realism is shown to be a position midway between the com-
monly accepted hard realism and the non-realist position discussed in subsection
2.3. Replacing hard realism with soft realism and individuals with individuation
carries profound consequences on understanding causation in quantum mechanical
systems and brings us closer to a consistent understanding of entanglement (and
other quantum effects as well).
4. The principle of locality considers spatial distinctions and effects over distances.
If spatial distinctions are subject to processes of individuation like other physical
properties, it is possible that our conception of the spatial separation at the basis of
locality requires refinement. Such refinement is proposed by Bergson’s metaphysics
of space as will be discussed in subsection 4.2.
5. Based on step 4, it is argued that in the case of entangled systems, and prior
to measurement, spatial separation and therefore distance as we conventionally
conceive do not exist. In other words, an entangled system while being spatially
extended, still exists in a single and not yet divisible (individuated) locality. This
is shown to be coherent with the adjusted understanding of causality discussed in
subsection 3.4.
6. It will follow that the predictions of quantum theory can be made consistent with
possible experiences without giving up neither realism nor locality on condition
that we ground possible experiences on the metaphysics of individuation proposed
here. Since the metaphysics of individuation does not exclude individuals, it seems
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to work remarkably well in cohering our understanding of both classical and quan-
tum phenomena.
3 Individuation and its application to physical systems
3.1 Critique of Boole’s conditions of possible experience
As already discussed in subsection 2.2 Boole’s conditions of possible experience arise
as a combination of logical propositions about properties of objects or events and the
probability of observing combinations of such properties. In the discourse to this point,
resolving the apparent paradox of the violation of Boole’s conditions was a matter of
providing physical or technical interpretations. Yet, there is another, less obvious, op-
tion: that Boole’s conditions themselves are the problem. What if, contrary to our
common-sense assumptions, Boole’s conditions are not the proper method of universally
representing possible experiences?
The notion of possible experience is quite profound; it makes explicit that in the world
of phenomena, not anything goes. In other words, that in the interactions between an
observer and the world certain regularities and conditions hold that make experiences
appear coherent and consistent. Boole’s conditions are in fact a metaphysical scheme
representing a fundamental belief about how the world is and how it can be represented.
Specifically that would mean: a) the world can be described as a collection of objects,
events and relations among them; b) objects and events are individuals defined by con-
crete sets of properties; c) individuals can be represented by predicates that specify
their properties; and finally, d) individuals, their relations and modifications can be
represented and reasoned about in terms of logical propositions about their properties.
Aristotle’s principle of the excluded middle that a property cannot both exist and not ex-
ist at the same time and there is no third option (the middle)6, establishes the individual
as a consistent and coherent concept.
In the light of the obvious violations of Boole’s conditions, we criticize the universal
adequacy of this metaphysical scheme. Perhaps there are phenomena that cannot be
given as individuals and therefore their representation as individuals cannot be expected
to yield logically consistent description of experience? In the urn example discussed
in subsection 2.2, a ball cannot be wooden, red but not wooden and red. But even
such common-sense example is warranted to work only as long as we deal with abstract
representations of properties. In the actual world however, it is not free of problems and
hidden assumptions and cannot be warranted to work in all cases7.
Another remarkable example that supports our critique is the questionable individu-
ality of a lump of sixteen cells (prior to blastulation) developing from a human fertilized
egg but prior to any differentiation. Is this merely a lump of cells, a human fetus (a
6Interestingly, in eastern philosophy, there is a third option and even more than one. See for example:
https://aeon.co/essays/the-logic-of-buddhist-philosophy-goes-beyond-simple-truth
7E.g. when the observations are made on distinct samples, conditions of lighting may affect the observed
color. Also things remain wooden only within a definite temperature range that might change from
sample to sample, etc.
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human person with person rights), or a tiny part of the mother’s body? It is entirely un-
clear how to categorize the object as the same set of properties can satisfy multiple sets
of propositions, each with very different and far reaching consequences. In such cases of
under-determined objects we have two options: either to add an additional metaphys-
ical presumption (e.g. the idea of spiritual conception at the moment of fertilization)
that will provide the missing determination, or, we can delay our answer and wait till a
natural developmental process will provide further determination.
It can be objected that in this example, the properties are given as facts and therefore
this is not a real problem but a question of the interpretation of facts, but a deeper
examination that will not be carried out here, can show that like in many other examples
a complete separation of subsets of properties that will distinctly determine (identify)
either case is not possible. Another objection would be that at any case we can never
know everything about an individual and therefore our representations are inherently
partial to the actual object being represented. There are always properties which are
hidden from us and these, once known, will resolve any question of determining the
nature of any phenomena in a consistent and coherent manner. This is indeed the claim
of all hidden variable explanations in our case. The objection tries to explain away the
metaphysical problem on the basis of the incompleteness of our knowledge. Clearly, in
the case of quantum entanglement this explanation fails for even if we hypothetically
had all the necessary facts still the paradox persists.
In phenomena such as quantum entanglement it is not anymore the case that one could
argue that separability and inseparability are only a matter of interpretation of the facts.
The inseparability of entangled pairs is the fact of the matter which casts a profound
doubt whether the metaphysical scheme of individuals is indeed universally fit to describe
natural phenomena. Apparently, quantum phenomena cannot always be represented in
terms of individuals, no wonder that Boole’s conditions of possible experience may be
violated. A reasonable response to this critique is that our metaphysical scheme must be
adjusted and extended to account for those cases where experiences are given but cannot
be represented in terms of individuals. The next subsection introduces an alternative
metaphysical scheme that transcends individuals.
3.2 Simondon’s theory of individuation
To grasp the concept of individuation, we first need to briefly review how the meta-
physical scheme based on individuals with an a priori given, unambiguously defined,
stable identity accounts for change and the genesis (individuation) of individuals. Gen-
erally speaking, we need to identify a principle(s) and the specific initial conditions of
its operation that together bring forth the individual. For example, planet earth is an
individual object. To account for its genesis, astrophysicists developed a theory about
the formation of planets and the necessary conditions for planets to form, e.g. the exis-
tence of a star such as the solar system. Inasmuch as this scheme makes sense, it suffers
a major weakness: it only shows how individuals (planets) are formed by positing other
individuals – in this case these are the identified necessary conditions that are given a
priori and an individual guiding principle – a theory of planets formation. Clearly, in
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the very way we commonly think and represent the world, individuals are the primary
metaphysical elements and individuation is only secondary (Weinbaum, 2015). It follows
therefore that we must always assume an already fully formed individual prior to any
individuation.
Gilbert Simondon was the first to criticize in depth the classical treatment of individ-
uation and the majority of his writings (Simondon, 2005) are dedicated to developing a
new philosophy of individuation. In (Simondon, 2009) he explains:
“Individuation has not been able to be adequately thought and described
because previously only one form of equilibrium was known–stable equilib-
rium. Metastable equilibrium was not known; being was implicitly supposed
to be in a state of stable equilibrium. [...] Antiquity knew only instability
and stability, movement and rest; they had no clear and objective idea of
metastability.” (see ahead)
Simondon offers a metaphysical scheme where the process of individuation is primary
while individuals are secondary products. The individual is only a relatively stable phase
in a dynamic metastable process and is always in possession of not yet actualized and
not yet known potentialities of further individuation. He writes:
“Individuation must therefore be thought of as a partial and relative res-
olution manifested in a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a
certain incompatibility within itself, an incompatibility due at once to forces
in tension as well as to the impossibility of interaction between terms of
extremely disparate dimensions.” (ibid.)
The process of individuation is described as the progressive determination of that which
is determinable in a system but is not yet determined. Individuation is about the
formation of distinctions that did not exist previously – it is about differentiation8.
An individual therefore is not anymore a rigid unity with ultimately given properties
but rather a plastic and dynamic entity in a metastable state punctuated by events of
transformation. Every such event reconfigures the system and the manner by which
further transformations become possible.
Metastability
The concept of metastability is central to Simondon’s theory. A metastable system is a
system with a number of temporary stable states where each state may display different
properties. Driven by the occurrence of external perturbations, a metastable system
moves among states of local stability and hence the designation that implies that no
single state is ultimately stable. Furthermore, in metastable systems properties may
differentiate or merge, distinct states appear and disappear and the very boundaries
delineating the system may change. Metastability implies a tension between stable and
unstable aspects of the individual (Combes and LaMarre, 2013).
8In its wider sense individuation speaks about both the formation and dissolution of distinctions.
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The preindividual
In its process of individuation, an individual is preceded by a state of affairs which
is yet undetermined – the preindividual. Deleuze, whose seminal work Difference and
Repetition draws on many of Simondon’s insights, would later describe the preindivid-
ual as “determinable but not yet determined” and individuation basically proceeds as
the preindividual’s “progressive determination”(Deleuze, 1994; Weinbaum, 2015). The
preindividual must not be understood as a kind of ultimate disorder. It may contain par-
tially individuated entities and principles that instruct its evolution to some extend but
the combination of whom cannot fully determine the outcome. Even after an individual
has reached a relatively stable state or formation, the preindividual is not necessarily
exhausted and keeps on persisting in the individuated system as a source of inherent
instability. It is the presence of the preindividual that allows subsequent individuation.
The unity characteristic of fully individuated beings (i.e. identities) and warranted
by the application of the principle of the excluded middle, cannot be applied anymore
to the preindividual. The preindividual is that intrinsic aspect of the individual that
goes beyond its unity and identity. It is important to emphasize here the metaphysical
sense in which this is said: individuals are not only more than what they appear to be
(in our representations), but also more than what they actually are. Precisely here lays
the paradigmatic shift in the metaphysical scheme from being (individuals) to becoming
(individuation).
Simondon also emphasizes that relations between individuals undergo individuation
too: “A relation does not spring up between two terms that are already separate indi-
viduals, rather, it is an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation. It
forms a part of a wider system.” (Simondon, 1992, p. 306). Furthermore, individuation
never brings to light an individual in a vacuum but rather an individual-milieu dyad.
This dyad contains both a system of distinctions and a system of relations. The individ-
ual and its milieu reciprocally determine each other as they develop as a system wider
than any individual.
Transduction
Transduction is a technical term Simondon is using to designate the abstract mechanism
of individuation. The term captures some of the most innovative (and important to
our case) characteristics of individuation. Understanding the term cannot make use of
classical logic and procedural descriptions because they require the usage of concepts
and relationships among concepts that only apply to the products of the operation of
individuation (Simondon, 2009, p. 10). Transduction comes to designate therefore a
metaphysical scheme that is constructed from a generative point of view that precedes
any a priori given individuals. In Simondon’s words:
One could, without a doubt, affirm that transduction cannot be presented
as a model of logical procedure having the value of a proof. Indeed, we do
not wish to say that transduction is a logical procedure in the current sense
of the term; it is a mental process, and even more than a process, it is a
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functioning of the mind that discovers [emphasis added]. This functioning
consists of following being in its genesis, in carrying out the genesis of thought
at the same time as the genesis of the object. (Simondon, 2009, p. 11).
To further highlight the metaphysical nature of transduction, Simondon argues that
transduction cannot be captured by the logical operations of either deduction or in-
duction. Transduction is not deductive since it does not posit a given principle(s) or
pattern(s) external to the process that can instruct the resolution of the present situ-
ation. Deduction can only highlight that which is already given by fully individuated
knowledge. Transduction ‘discovers’, or rather brings forth, elements and relations that
did not exist before. Furthermore, transduction is not inductive in the sense that it does
not extract or highlight the properties or patterns common to the unique and not yet
compatible elements of the individuating process. These usually serve as the basis to
inductive reasoning about the process, thereby eliminating what is unique to the ele-
ments. Instead, “[T]ransduction is, on the contrary, a discovery of dimensions of which
the system puts into communication [...] each of its terms, and in such a way that the
complete reality of each of the terms of the domain can come to order itself without loss,
without reduction, in the newly discovered structures.” (ibid., p. 12).
Application to quantum phenomena
In brief, quantum systems prior to measurement are not fully individuated. The mea-
surement of a complementary property in a quantum entangled system is an individu-
ating event in respect to the property being measured9 in the sense that it determines
something that was not determined before, it brings forth a distinction, a differentia-
tion. Measurement does not merely change the state of our knowledge about reality. It
actually changes the state of both knowledge and reality. As we have seen, these, ac-
cording to Simondon, individuate together (Combes and LaMarre, 2013). In this sense,
measurement in quantum systems realizes the transduction mechanism.
Describing measurement as an individuating event elegantly fits the fact that com-
plementary properties cannot be simultaneously measured and require distinct samples
(see subsection 2.2). Individuation takes place when some property which was not de-
termined, gets determined. But clearly a property cannot be determined twice from the
very same predetermined state. Individuating events are ultimately unique, hence can
each be sampled only once.
Interestingly, the concept superposition of states can be understood as a projection of
individuated properties post measurement back to the non-individuated state of affairs
prior to measurement. The wave functions being superimposed, are always in conjunc-
tion to an arbitrarily selected specific measurement (e.g. measuring spin or polarization
in direction x), they have no meaning independent of the measurement settings. This
9Generally, a measurement is not always an individuating event. It depends whether the actions
involved in the measurement produce for the measured system a perturbation strong enough as
to move it from its current stability towards another stability. But it can be said that in every
individuation event, certain determinations must take place and therefore it can always be understood
as measurement in the broad sense.
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quantum wave modality illustrates best a system in the course of individuation. Even
when an individuating event takes place, the system becomes individuated and yields a
concrete and consistent outcome only in the context of that same event (measurement).
But since every arbitrary measurement that follows potentially changes the reality of
the system, the preindividual intrinsic to the system is never exhausted.
A quantum system is therefore an exemplar of a metastable individuating system.
All its individual products are always given only in relation to the latest individuation
event. The probabilities associated with superimposed states should not be interpreted
as if they reflect frequencies of already defined properties (like in the urn example). They
rather indicate a statistical regularity of how the undifferentiated state might evolve and
this depends of course on what is already known and what will be measured next.
In summary, Simondon’s theory presents a paradigm shift in the way we can relate
to the quantum world: from a view based on individual entities, to a view based on
ontogenetic processes that bring forth individual entities. The implications of this shift
on understanding quantum phenomena are discussed next.
3.3 Individuation and realism
The most counter intuitive and intriguing behavior of entangled systems is the case
where separability is challenged. Separability means that spatially separate systems
posses separate real states (real is said here in the physical sense). Howard (1985)
strongly emphasizes the profound significance of separability for physics:
[I]t should be understood that the separability of two systems is not the
same thing as the absence of an interaction between them, nor is the presence
of an interaction the mark of their non-separability. The separability princi-
ple operates on a more basic level as, in effect, a principle of individuation
for physical systems, a principle whereby we determine whether in a given
situation we have only one system or two. If two systems are not separable,
then there can be no interaction between them, because they are not really
two systems at all.
Quantum entangled systems definitely do not follow this principle. For example, a pair of
particles10 having their spins entangled form a system which is not fully individuated and
therefore inseparable. Distinct individual spins do not exist for each of the particles11
constituting the system; there is only an internally correlated joint spin state for the
whole system. Of course inseparability is reflected in the mathematical formalism used
to represent such states. It uses the principle of superposition borrowed from the fact
that individual particles behave also as waves that can be superimposed and yields
an expression that provably cannot be decomposed into separate expressions for each
particle.
10Generally, more than two particles can be entangled and form systems where individuation can take
many paths and can become intractably complex.
11We can call them particles because they may still posses other properties such as mass or charge that
partially identifies them as distinct entities.
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Einstein’s concerns regarding quantum theory were centered on the fact that in its
very formalism it denies the principle of separability. For him, separability seemed to be
the essence of realism:
However, if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different
parts of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see
what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to be a system is,
after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide
up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts.
(Howard, 1985, p. 191)
Einstein was worried that without separability, there will be no way to objectively dis-
tinguish between physical systems and this will inevitably leave us only with subjective,
observer-dependent (and arbitrary) interpretation of what constitutes a physical sys-
tem. It is also clear that Boole’s conditions of possible experience are exactly those
conditions under which the “statements about the parts” mentioned by Einstein can be
safely made and tested. They are constructed in a manner that ensures the separability
of observed systems. This is why we cannot expect entangled quantum systems to follow
Boole’s conditions because these require that all properties to be fully differentiated and
separable (e.g., in the urn example, woodenness should never depend on redness etc.).
It is here that Simondon’s metaphysical scheme becomes relevant to the problems
discussed in this paper. What Simondon’s scheme allows is to metaphysically accom-
modate individuating non-separable systems. This necessarily changes the whole view
about reality (not only quantum reality): individuals occupy only a small and secondary
part of reality. Entities in the course of individuation with yet undifferentiated prop-
erties are the rule rather than the exception. It is only an epistemological convention
(and convenience) that we approximate such entities by representative individuals. Such
approximation allows to represent phenomena in terms of discrete predicates and log-
ical propositions. But reality is far from being fully captured by such representations,
and apparently there are vastly more possible experiences than those allowed by Boole’s
conditions that apply only to individuals.
We can contrast now hard realism – a description of phenomena in terms of fully
formed individuals with soft realism – a much broader description that includes par-
tially formed individuals with as yet undifferentiated properties12. Applied to quantum
phenomena, with soft realism we depart from the conventional realist position which is
hard realism but we do not have to to go as far as the non-realist position that denies
altogether the existence of measurement-independent properties either. To assert that
measurement is instrumental to the individuation of certain systems is to affirm that
reality is not something which is either a priori given or does not exist at all but rather
that reality is in a continuous process of individuation (ontogeny).
We already know that representations based on hard realism are problematic. The
violation of Boole’s conditions is clear enough evidence for that. But does soft realism
help us to achieve a more consistent representation? It seems that it does. Based on
12The term partial identity can be synonymously applied.
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Simondon’s metaphysical scheme, soft realism allows a novel kind of possible experience
– a partially individuated entity as exemplified by entangled systems. For such systems,
the so called violations predicted by the theory and validated by experiment are not
violations at all. Quantum theory predicts with unprecedented success the outcome of
measurements performed on systems that are only partially individuated. The trou-
blesome correlations discussed in section 2 positively indicate the inseparability of the
entangled system, but now we have a metaphysical scheme that accommodates this fact.
Physics remains intact and our understanding of the world gains a profound refinement
and much needed consistency of representation. This view is supported by Howard as
well:
[...] We should make the existence of quantum correlations a criterion of
non-separability. After all, if it were not for the existence of these peculiar
correlations which violate the Bell inequality, the separability principle would
not be threatened. In other words, what I suggest is that instead of taking
the quantum correlations as a puzzle needing explanation, we should make
these correlations themselves the explanation [...] (Howard, 1985, p. 198)
What Howard was seriously missing is the metaphysical backup provided by Simondon’s
theory. Without it, his suggestion seems to be merely an arbitrary choice of convenience.
But it makes much sense in the light of the metaphysical scheme of individuation: spatial
separation is not enough as the ultimate criterion of separability. We will discuss this
further in section 4.
3.4 Individuation and conditions of possible causal explanation
Individuation is an abstract process that does not provide the specific physical mecha-
nism of the actual determinations and differentiations that take place in its course. For
that matter it does not even provide a hint as to what kind of explanations one can
expect. Quantum theory is a theory of statistical regularities. Conventional classical
thinking seeks to explain statistical regularities as originating from actual distributions
of properties in an hypothetical population of individuals with a priori defined identi-
ties. But this approach is rooted in hard realism and does not offer a viable resolution
of the paradox. From the perspective of soft realism, quantum theory describes systems
undergoing individuation. These do not ‘hide’ mysterious individual elements (hidden
variables) on which causative explanations can be anchored. Does soft realism offers an
alternative to conventional causative explanations?
We have already seen in subsection 2.3 that abandoning realism might be a way out.
Pitowsky makes it clear that the issue at stake is not so much giving up realism but
the idea of giving up causality – more precisely the principle that no event happens
without a cause. Pitowsky’s suggestion that the statistical regularities in the case of
quantum entanglement have no causal explanation is not as speculative and dismissive
of causation as it might seem at first sight. He writes: “There is no ’deeper reality’ which
causes them [the statistical regularities] to occur; the phenomena themselves are their
deepest explanation.” (Pitowsky, 1994, p. 118). If we carefully reexamine this quote in
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the light of the inseparability of entangled systems we find a deeper sense. Given two
entangled particles A and B, how can we describe the effect of measurement on A on
the measurement on B if the particles are not separable? If A and B are one and not
two distinct systems, in what sense can one produce effects on the other? Is it not the
case that both cause and effect are internal to a single non-decomposable whole and
this is the best one can do in describing what is going on without dismissing causality
altogether?
Thinking in terms of individuals necessitates that in order for one entity to act upon
another one and cause an effect, they need to be separate and external to each other.
Even feedback systems that when observed from outside can be seen as if acting upon
themselves, can always be represented as having internal structure that separates input
subsystems from output subsystems. In this sense, a causative relation is always a rela-
tion of externality – external to the related elements. Thinking in terms of individuation
is entirely different. A system in the course of individuation is in a state where elements
are not entirely differentiated yet not entirely homogeneous and indistinct either. In such
systems a causative relation can be understood only as a relation of internality where
both the acting and acted upon elements are not entirely distinct; their relation therefore
is internal to them13. And since they are not entirely distinct one cannot even discern
the direction of action – which of the elements is the acting and which is the affected14.
In other words, causes and their effects are confused. It seems that this state of affairs
can receive only an approximate description using a language optimally fitted to mostly
describe relations of externality. It can be said however that the causation relation itself
is individuating and not entirely distinct (see above p. 13 on the preindividual).
The traditional concept of causality involved two requirements: spatio-temporal con-
tiguity and regularity (similar causes are followed by similar effects) (Ben-Menahem,
1989). The core of Hume’s skepticism regarding causality was that the causing agent
and the affected agent are ultimately distinct. There is always something that must
come between them to mediate action and this necessity, Hume argued, cannot be log-
ically established; it is only empirically established. In other words, effects cannot be
logically derived from causes only inferred. In individuating systems we face a different
and in some sense an opposite problem where the causing agent and the affected agent
though spatially separate are not entirely distinct. Contiguity in this case attains a sense
which is other than the traditional spatio-temporal relation; it is contiguity defined in
terms of an additional property dimension. If this dimension represents for example the
direction of spin, there is only a single (yet arbitrary) value representing the direction
of both particles. The particles therefore are found contiguous on this dimension. In
13The idea of the difference between relations of externality (that require the separation of elements)
and relations of internality (that require continuity and interpenetration of elements) originated in
the works of another eminent philosopher of beginning of the 20th century Henri Bergson (Bergson,
2001, p. 227) (see also: (Deleuze, 1991)). Bergson’s work predates Simondon’s and deeply inspired
his philosophy of individuation. His work will be further discussed in section 4
14With relativistic considerations taken into account, the measurement on either particle can precede
the measurement on the other depending on the frame of reference of the observer. In as far as causes
precede effects the ambiguity of the situation is very real.
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contrast to being a mere empirical fact obtained by observation; it is an ontological and
logically established contiguity. Nowhere and in no case can one intervene to change the
property of one particle without affecting a change in the other. If two things cannot be
separated, they are necessarily contiguous in some very significant sense. It can be said,
therefore, that the relation of entanglement is stronger than the traditional causal rela-
tion; the mutual effect is more profound. It is not mere regularity that we observe in the
behaviors of entangled particles it is logical necessity arising from their non-separability.
Furthermore, there is neither metaphysical nor logical reason to privilege one physical
property (spatial separation) over another (non-separable spin states) in judging the
distinctiveness of elements of an entangled system. Hence, ‘action over distance’ fails
to describe what is going on in entangled systems. Clearly the relation of entanglement
involves both more than and less than what we conventionally conceive in the concept
of action (causing something to happen). The following section will continue to further
scrutinize the application of the notion of spatial separation to entangled systems.
The position of soft realism towards causality again takes advantage of the concept
of individuation to establish that physical interactions can be more subtle and complex
as to neatly fit into or be excluded from the traditional category of causal relations.
Individuating relations are understood as relations of internality rather than relations of
externality. Measurement as an individuating event, externalizes (exposes to the external
observer) a relation that was internal up to that point. Consequently, the states of both
knowledge and reality have thus changed.
To this point, the discussion focused on a single system of entangled particles. How
does this analysis reflect on explaining the actual statistical regularities predicted by
Quantum theory? Are we still stuck in a position that forces us to choose between
a paradoxical explanation (non-local effects) and no explanation at all (non-realism)?
Is there an alternative supported by the analysis above? There is no doubt that the
statistical results of EPR type experiments are reflecting the behavior of a population
of entangled systems. We can now see that the paradox arises because the population
is of individuating entities and not of individuals. Since measurements are individuat-
ing events, and no single system can be individuated more than once, complementary
properties must then be measured on distinct samples of the population. This wouldn’t
normally pose a problem if not for the fact that the population prior to measurement
and the population post measurement are not the same populations. There is an meta-
physical difference between the members of the two populations, they are not of the same
kind. Whereas the first is of individuating pairs, the second is of pairs of individuals.
The paradox arises when we expect the first to behave as the second would as if they
were of one and the same kind. Accepting this difference brings us back to Pitowski’s
words: “[T]he phenomena themselves are their deepest explanation.” If individuation is
a fundamental state of reality there is no need to seek for a deeper explanatory element.
It is entanglement itself that explains the correlations discovered in experiment.
In summary, while conventional causative relation cannot be said to exist between
the particles of a single entangled pair and needs to be replaced by the more refined
understanding of their relation as suggested above, accepting entangled systems as indi-
viduating instead of individuals is enough to cause the observed statistical regularities.
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It is simply not an a priori distribution but how individuation works. For any sample
of the population, the fact of having belonged to a single undifferentiated entity leaves
a trace in the behavior of each and every pair that measurement brings forth.
4 The individuation of space
4.1 Rethinking locality and its role in individuation
We have seen the criticality and problematics of separability to the understanding of
entangled systems and to the notion of realism. The definition of separability as discussed
in subsection 3.3 requires that spatially distinct system must have separate real physical
states. As much as the definition seems simple and straight forward, a closer examination
exposes an unexpected complication. If we understand spatial separation to be a purely
physical property, there is no reason (as already mentioned) to privilege it over other
physical properties in judging whether two physical systems are separate or not. Perhaps
it is only a perceptual habit to see spatial separation as some kind of an primal criterion?
Perhaps a pair of entangled particles is a single system spatially extended but spatial
separation is only secondary in significance? More relevantly to our issue, we must
consider systems where elements are both separable and not. If on the other hand
space is more than just a pure physical property; that it somehow transcends the purely
physical, than on account of such transcendence, its special privileged status might be
justified. According to Kant, space indeed enjoys a special status:
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer expe-
riences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside
me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I
find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as
outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but
as in different places, the representation of space must already underlie them.
[...] Therefore, the representation of space cannot be obtained through expe-
rience from the relations of outer appearance; this outer experience is itself
possible at all only through that representation. [...] Space is a necessary a
priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge
a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think
that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as
the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination
dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily
underlies outer appearances. (Kant, Guyer, and Wood, 1998)
In other words, the separability in space, which comes a priori to any representation
is a sufficient condition that systems separated by space alone are already physically
separated in any possible experience and therefore must also posses separable real states.
Janiak (2012) makes an interesting distinction between a realist relationalism and realist
absolutism in regards to space. Whilst the first is the position that space is the order
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of possible relations among objects, the latter is the position that space is an object-
independent framework for object relations. From the perspective of the first position,
it is conceivable that spatial separation might depend on other relations between objects
(e.g. their quantum states). It might be the case that separation and conventional
distance are not one and the same and not any conventional distance automatically
reflects a separation as this may depend on other non-spatial relations between the
systems under consideration. The second position that claims an object-independent
status to space, seems however to be the one consistent with Einstein’s views. From the
standpoint of special relativity, signals can move through space-time only in a limited
speed. Spatial separation means therefore a limit on the communication between two
physical systems and this limit was in Einstein’s eyes a fundamental one because this
very communication is a priori intrinsic to any relation and any physical interaction
between two physical entities.
Yet it is clear that entangled systems that are spatially separated do not communicate
in a manner that violates special relativity in any respect. They do however relate in a
special manner as if no spatial separation exists between them. I argue here that Ein-
stein’s concern regarding quantum phenomena arose from his realist absolutism position
which is a metaphysical one15. But there is no compelling point to hold to this position
because it is not the only one that is consistent with empirical data. The alternative
realist relationalism which is intrinsic to soft realism is consistent with existing theory
and all empirical data and in the case of the EPR paradox invites to reexamine the
deeper meaning of locality in entangled systems and whether the principle of locality is
indeed violated. I will argue that based on the metaphysical scheme of individuation, in
the case of entangled objects, space as the order of possible relations among objects is
itself subject to individuation inasmuch as the relations it orders themselves individuate.
This will lead us to consider an additional metaphysical adjustment having to do with
the concept of locality. The argument is based on the metaphysics of space developed
by Bergson which is briefly presented next.
4.2 Bergson’s metaphysics of space
Bergson’s metaphysics of time and space is very rich and complex. It is not within
the scope of this paper to provide the wider context of Bergson’s writings16 which are
necessary for the deeper grasp of his metaphysical method. Here we try to extract in brief
only the few points which are relevant to the topic at hand. At the basis of Bergson’s
thought about the metaphysical nature of space is a combination of the following three
philosophical observations.
15It might sound strange that Einstein who conceived relativity theory held a realist absolutist position.
But the sense of absolutism here is the claim that spatio-temporal relations between objects are the
basis to any other relation and antecedent to any other relation. ‘Realist absolutist’ is just another
name to a position that privileges spatio-temporal distinctions to any other distinction.
16Especially “Time and Free Will” and “Duration and Simultaneity” – Bergson’s investigation of rela-
tivity theory (Bergson, 1965, 2001).
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Distinction between space and extensity
In (Bergson, 2001) we find the following:
We must thus distinguish between the perception of extensity and the
conception of space: they are no doubt implied in one another, but, the
higher we rise in the scale of intelligent beings, the more clearly do we meet
with the independent idea of a homogeneous space:
The distinction is a subtle one: while extensity is an actual objective manifestation
of physical objects, space, Bergson argues, is conceptual and involves the mind of an
observer. The exact nature of the concept and its function will become clear in the
following.
Homogeneity of space
Furthermore, Bergson contrasts the qualitative heterogeneity of our conscious experience
with the homogeneity of space:
What we must say is that we have to do with two different kinds of reality,
the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous,
namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the human intellect, enables
us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to
speak. (ibid., p. 97)
According to Bergson, the reality of experience is a continuum of heterogeneous qual-
itative change that does not admit any intrinsic distinction or separation. Only by
projecting this continuum onto space, one can start making distinctions and separa-
tions:
[S]pace is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simul-
taneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation
other than that of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a reality
with no quality. (ibid., p. 95)
The homogeneity of space is exactly this: being devoid of quality. As such, it is always
external to anything with quality. Therefore, space is the kind of reality that enables
relations of externality. Without applying the concept of space one can only conceive of
relations of internality where no separation can be made17.
17This is quite easy to see: if something having a quality A changes into having quality B what happens
at the limit between A and B? The limit must either consists of both A and B or neither, for any
of the other options (i.e. either A or B) is not consistent with it being a limit. If the limit consists
of both A and B it is impossible to fully separate A from B because at least at their limit they are
inseparable. The option that the limit consists of neither A nor B is indeed the only one left. Now
suppose the limit consist of having another quality C different from both A and B, then we must now
ask recursively the same questions about the limit where A changes to C etc. We are left therefore
with the option that C is the absence of any quality. Only in such case we can claim that A and B
are indeed mutually external to each other and entirely separate. C is Bergson’s conception of space.
It is in fact the Aristotelian middle being excluded.
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Space is infinitely divisible
The third and most important observation is brought in the following quote from Matter
and Memory (Bergson, 1991, p. 206): “Abstract space is, indeed, at bottom, nothing but
the mental diagram of infinite divisibility.” Bergson further explains:
Such is the primary and the most apparent operation of the perceiving
mind: it marks out divisions in the continuity of the extended, simply fol-
lowing the suggestions of our requirement and the needs of practical life. But,
in order to divide the real in this manner, we must first persuade ourselves
that the real is divisible at will. Consequently we must throw beneath the
continuity of sensible qualities, that is to say, beneath concrete extensity, a
network, of which the meshes may be altered to any shape whatsoever and
become as small as we please: this substratum which is merely conceived,
this wholly ideal diagram of arbitrary and infinite divisibility, is homogeneous
space. (ibid., pp. 209-210)
Space and individuation
Bergson’s thought brings forth interesting points relevant to our investigation. Under-
standing space as a mental diagram of divisibility and distinguishing it from extensity
means that physical extensity does not automatically imply divisibility. In other words,
physical objects and systems may be extended without being divisible. Moreover, divisi-
bility is not fundamental; continuity and non-separation are the fundamental conditions
of the real according to Bergson. Divisibility which is necessary for separability is not
intrinsic to the real18; it requires an extra “ideal diagram” to be casted beneath the
real. This is to say that spatial separation based only on extensity is not metaphysically
privileged (or a priori warranted) over other physical qualities. In fact, the very idea of
pure spatial separability that appears to be deeply intuitive is put into question.
One may go as far as concluding that Bergson’s concept of space and divisibility is
fundamentally subjective and requires the intervention of the mind of an observer. But
Bergson’s idea is more subtle: divisibility and separation may still be observer inde-
pendent thus sustaining their realist status. However, one cannot distinguish between
two objects only on account of the absence of a quality. Space can be thrown beneath
a continuity of sensible qualities, but if these are missing there is nothing to divide or
separate. In other words, physical entities, whether observed or not, are not and cannot
be separated only on account of purely geometrical relations.
From here it is clear how this conceptualization of space is consistent with the realist
relationalism position mentioned in the previous subsection: space as the order of possible
relations among objects. In as far as physical entities can be separated at all, and since
they cannot be separated only on account of an absence of quality (i.e. only spatial
separation), it follows that the condition of their separation is that their possible relations
18Remakably, the concept of distance as reflecting spatial separation is applicable therefore only on
account of space being homogeneous, devoid of quality and divisible. Without these, we can speak
distance only as some conventional measure of extensity.
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must be based on concrete qualities/properties. There must be something rather than
nothing which space might divide. But if that ‘something’, that physical entity, is
spatially extended but nevertheless intrinsically indivisible, space cannot possibly make
it divisible though our habitual intuitions may tell us otherwise. Only in cases where
physical entities are divisible and separable on account of other qualities or properties,
the idea of space applies to represent their distinction. At the beginning of subsection
3.3 we defined and discussed the concept of separability (i.e. spatial separation implies
separation in state) and its importance. It is clear now that the concept is based on
presuming the primacy of spatial separation over all other quality based distinctions.
This primacy, we find, is merely a feature of a particular metaphysical scheme. I have
presented here an alternative metaphysics of space without this particular feature. I also
argue that there is no reasonable basis for such primacy. The bottom line of this whole
discussion is that in our proposed metaphysical scheme, spatial separation does not and
cannot imply separation in state on its own; on the contrary, separation in state is a
necessary condition to spatial separation.
From the perspective of the metaphysics of individuation, there is no a priori condi-
tion of entities being divisible or not. In other words, divisibility (i.e. separability) itself
can individuate; which means that it is possible that a certain physical entity is spa-
tially extended but not divisible will individuate and bring forth two or more spatially
separate entities that did not exist before19. This very possibility of the individuation of
separability as a consequence of the individuation of other physical states and relations
is the additional adjustment we need to accommodate following the metaphysical scheme
of individuation.
4.3 Locality in entangled systems
Let us now return to the case of a system constituted by two entangled physical entities
in an EPR kind of setup. Following our new metaphysical scheme, though the system
is spatially extended, we cannot take for granted anymore that the entangled entities
involved are spatially separated. Considering only the entangled property, there is no
way we can assign an independent state to any of the entities constituting the system
and this implies that space as a principle of differentiation is not applicable. In other
words, there is no meaningful way to speak about locality or distance within the entangled
system. This may seem quite incredible and counter intuitive but this is only because
our profound habit of perceiving and thinking in terms of sharply defined individuals
and also that anything spatially extended is also spatially divisible.
We already argued in subsection 3.4 that the spooky action at a distance that has
become emblematic of entangled systems is not an action in the conventional sense of
the word. We now complement that argument: it might well be a spooky action but there
is no distance that reflects distinct localities! It is by now a well established fact that
entangled systems behave the same no matter how far they are spatially extended. What
we conventionally measure as a distance between the entangled entities reflects extension
19Also the other direction is possible: where two or more spatially separate entities merge into a single
undifferentiated spatially extended entity.
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but the separation it seem to reflect is only a feature of our conditioned imagination.
The physical entities involved do not behave in any manner as to indicate that there is
any spatial separation derived from the measured distance between them.
Reality, of course, is not that simple. Each of the entities constituting an entangled
system may (and often does) possess in addition to the entangled property other proper-
ties such as mass and charge that are independent. In such cases which are the majority,
the spatial separation between the entities is not fully individuated. The entities are
both spatially separable and inseparable depending on which of their properties is under
consideration. Such state of affairs which is contradictory according to the metaphysical
scheme of individuals, is entirely consistent within the metaphysical scheme of individ-
uation.
In summary, locality in entangled systems is not an a priori given but individuating.
Prior to measurement, it is not yet differentiated. The system is spatially extended by not
spatially divisible. A measurement of the entangled property is an individuating event;
it brings about a differentiation in state and consequently spatial separation between
the once entangled entities.
Inasmuch as individuation allows us to think in terms of soft realism, it allows us
to think in terms of soft locality too. Hard locality is based on the assumption that
spatial separability is a given and therefore the location of a physical entity in relation
to other such entities can always be singled out. Soft locality does not assume that;
instead, it accepts that spatial separability is not a given and is not applicable in the
absence of other separating physical properties. Contrary to that, it is conditioned on
the presence of entities with independent properties or states. If physical entities do
not possess such properties they cannot be said to be spatially separated even though
they together may constitute a spatially extended system. Soft locality does not give
up locality but distinguishes between cases where space as a differentiating principle is
applicable and cases where it is not. But most remarkably, soft realism accepts locality
as an individuating feature of physical systems.
5 Conclusion
The problematics presented by the EPR paradox have nothing to do with the facts of
physics and the predictions of quantum theory. We have clarified that the problem is first
and foremost epistemological. We expect that our knowledge of reality to be coherent
and consistent across all phenomena at all scales but the observed violations of Boole’s
conditions of possible experience in the behavior of quantum entangled systems clearly
put in question such coherency.
Along almost a century of discourse about how to resolve the paradoxical findings
involved in quantum phenomena, three different ideas played a major role namely:
a) the incompleteness of quantum theory, b) accepting non-locality, and c) accepting
non-realism. Though we can never assure the completeness of the theory, the latest
empirical findings prove that even if quantum theory is incomplete, either non-realism
or non-locality are still necessary to resolve the apparent paradox. Clearly, neither of
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these resolutions coexists comfortably with how we understand the rest of reality. The
more we try to cohere them the more disturbing they become.
In this paper I propose a different approach to the resolution of the paradox. It
is argued that the paradox is rooted in the metaphysical scheme that is supposed to
provide a foundation to our knowledge of reality (including also our intuitions). This
metaphysical scheme is based on the idea that reality is given in terms of individuals.
It is from this idea that Boole’s conditions of possible experience are derived. I argue
that the violations of Boole’s conditions do not indicate neither an incompleteness of
quantum theory, nor lack of understanding its meaning. What they do indicate is failure
to accommodate certain phenomena within the metaphysical scheme that we use. In
other words, there are actual experiences that do not comply with Boole’s conditions
which means that they cannot be described within a metaphysical scheme based only on
individuals. The solution to the paradox would therefore be achieved by modifying and
expanding the metaphysical scheme that we use as a basis of our knowledge of reality
into one that can accommodate the actual experiences involved in quantum phenomena.
Based on the works of Simondon and Bergson, I have proposed here an alternative
metaphysical scheme which is based on the idea that reality is given in terms of processes
of continuous individuation and where individuals are only impermanent products of such
processes. I have shown that within such a scheme our notion of realism changes from
hard realism to soft realism and also, as space itself individuates, our notion of locality
changes from hard locality to soft locality. I have further shown that individuation
as a metaphysical concept and the consequent adjustment thus made to both realism
and locality, allows us a coherent description of quantum entanglement within a wider
epistemological framework and provides an elegant resolution of the paradox.
As a concluding note I would like to briefly reflect on the method underlying this paper.
Though the discourse in this paper focused on the EPR paradox, most of the arguments
that were brought here and the application of the metaphysical scheme of individuation
are relevant and generally applicable to a very wide spectrum of phenomena. It is my
belief that metaphysics has an important if not critical role in the progress of scientific
knowledge and our general understanding of reality. Metaphysics systematizes a set
of fundamental assumptions about reality. Surely, it does not precede reality but it
does precede the manner by which we perceive and conceptualize our perceptions into
representations that constitute a coherent and reliable body of knowledge. As such, and
because it is so fundamental it tends to hide from the scrutinizing eye and its precepts
are often taken for an unassailable truths never to be questioned. There is only one
remedy to this situation: metaphysics must not be isolated from science and science
must not be isolated from metaphysics, one must keep the other in progressive check as
both are undergoing individuation. Together they form a vital exchange, a dance that
brings forth knowledge and the elegance of coherence.
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